Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2017 6 BCLR 675 (CC) was a dispute over a multi-billion-rand tender. Although the majority of the Constitutional Court recognised the public importance of the case, it adjudicated the dispute entirely on a preliminary point. It found that the applicant did not have legal standing to seek the judicial review of the award of the tender.
Introduction
Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 1 was a dispute over a multi-billion-rand 2 tender. Although the majority of the Constitutional Court recognised the public importance of the case, 3 it adjudicated the dispute entirely on a preliminary point. It found that the applicant in the court of first instance, Westinghouse Electric Belgium Société Anonyme (hereafter referred to as Westinghouse), did not have legal standing to seek the judicial review of the award of the tender. 4 This case note has three aims. First, I will argue that the Constitutional Court's majority judgment in Areva was generally unpersuasive. Second, I will attempt to show that Areva exposes an unresolved legal question: when should a court consider the merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing? Third, I will propose a method for resolving this question in any given case. I start by briefly considering the development of the law on legal standing, as this provides the context for the ensuing discussion.
A broadened approach to legal standing
Legal standing determines whether a particular litigant is entitled to approach a court for relief. 5 It is a tool a court uses to determine if a litigant "is entitled to claim its time, and to put the opposing litigant to trouble." 6 To obtain legal standing, a litigant must meet two overarching requirements: he must have the capacity to litigate, and a sufficient interest in the matter before the court. 7 The sufficient-interest requirement is generally of greater concern to litigation with a public-law dimension. 8 This is exemplified by the facts in Areva: no one challenged Westinghouse's capacity to litigate; however, it was contentious whether it satisfied the sufficient-interest H VAN EETVELDT PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 3 requirement. As such, I consider only the sufficient-interest requirement in this note.
Under common law before 1994, a litigant would have legal standing only if he had a sufficient, direct, and personal interest in the matter before the court. 9 A court would recognise that the litigant possessed such an interest only if the litigant was personally adversely affected by the impugned act. 10 It would not suffice to show that the impugned act harmed the public in general: there had to be a personal nexus between the litigant and the impugned act. 11
Our common law thus allowed only a narrow range of persons to be heard by the courts. Moreover, particularly in administrative-law disputes, courts were prone to apply the rules on standing formalistically. 12 The common law on standing was therefore doubly restrictive: its rules were stringent and its judicial approach was narrow. 13 Section 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) and its predecessor, section 7(4) of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter the
Interim Constitution) introduced a "radical departure" 14 from the common law on standing. Section 38 of the Constitution states:
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are - It is plain from the text of section 38 that the Constitution affords standing to litigants that are not personally adversely affected by the law or conduct they impugn. Section 38(c), for instance, allows a litigant to act in the interest of a class of persons, while section 38(d) allows a litigant to act in the interest of the public at large. This is clearly a departure from the commonlaw position.
The Constitution not only expanded the rules on standing, but it also expanded the approach courts should use to interpret and apply those rules.
In Ferreira v Levin; Vryenhoek v Powell, 15 the Constitutional Court (per Chaskalson P) held:
Whilst it is important that this Court should not be required to deal with abstract or hypothetical issues, and should devote its scarce resources to issues that are properly before it, I can see no good reason for adopting a narrow approach to the issue of standing in Constitutional cases. On the contrary, it is my view that we should rather adopt a broad approach to standing. This would be consistent with the mandate given to this Court to uphold the Constitution and would serve to ensure that Constitutional rights enjoy the full measure of the protection to which they are entitled. 16 In a separate concurring judgment, O'Regan J explained the rationale for this broadened judicial approach. O'Regan J pointed out that the commonlaw rules on standing developed in the context of private litigation, which involves disputes between private individuals. Generally, such litigation does not affect people that are not parties to the dispute before the court. 17 In litigation with a public dimension, however, the relief sought may affect a wide range of people who are not parties to the dispute, and the alleged harm may "be quite diffuse or amorphous". 18 Although O'Regan J was careful not to construct an artificial binary distinction between private and public litigation, 19 she pointed out that section 7(4) of the Interim Constitution Cameron J reiterated that the own-interest-standing requirement must be broadly interpreted. 25 He held that court should keep in mind that standing is "not a technical or strictly-defined concept", that there is "no magical formula for conferring it", and that it should be determined pragmatically with reference to the facts of the case before the court. 26
Cameron J also held that a court should consider questions of standing before it engages with the merits of the case. 27 This has important consequences. 28 It means that standing is not determined by the merits of a legal challenge, but rather with the relationship between the challenge and the interests of the party seeking to make it. As such, an own-interest litigant may be denied standing even if this means that irregular conduct is obscured from judicial scrutiny. 29 But the separation between standing and merits is not absolute. Cameron J indicated that there may be cases where a court will consider the merits For reasons I will explain below, I am of the view that this proposition is particularly relevant to Areva, and raises questions that the law on standing does not currently answer. I refer to the proposition as the "Giant-Concerts exception" for ease of reference. 32 I will now consider Areva, starting with the background to the dispute.
Background to the dispute in Areva
Areva was a dispute about a tender for the replacement of steam generators in the Koeberg nuclear power station. 33 The periodic replacement of these generators is vital to the sustainability of South-Africa's electricity resources. 34 Eskom SOC Ltd (hereafter referred to as Eskom), the organ of state responsible for the power station, was of the view that it was a nuclear safety priority that the generators had to be replaced by 2018. 35 In 
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The relationship between Westinghouse and Westinghouse USA
Before the Constitutional Court Areva persisted with its challenge to Westinghouse's standing. Westinghouse maintained that it had standing to impugn Eskom's decision because it had submitted its own bid. 48 As far as its relationship with Westinghouse USA was concerned, Westinghouse averred that it merely received the "support" of Westinghouse USA, 49 as both Westinghouse USA and it belonged to the Westinghouse group of companies. The majority was admirably conscientious in its attention to detail. But it may have been so narrowly focussed on evidentiary minutiae that it failed to adopt a broad approach to the facts. The majority held, for instance, that if the abovementioned letter did not show that Westinghouse was an agent of Westinghouse USA, "then nothing will". 52 Perhaps that is so. But this does not exclude the possibility that there could be equally compelling countervailing evidence. Yet the majority treated the letter as if it excluded the possibility of such evidence.
There were also factual indications that Westinghouse was a bidder in its own right. These were considered by the minority, which took a broader, pragmatic approach to the facts. Beside the fact that Westinghouse said on affidavit that it was a bidder, the minority also took into account that during the bid-evaluation process Westinghouse and Westinghouse USA acted in concert. It also took into account the fact that Eskom never doubted that Westinghouse would replace the steam generators. 53 While the majority saw the abovementioned letter as proof that Westinghouse was the agent of Westinghouse USA, the minority saw the letter as showing only that "a party may have mixed up its corporate identity within the litigating multinational group of companies". 54
Now, if Westinghouse submitted a bid as an agent of Westinghouse USA, the majority was correct to reject Westinghouse's argument that its interests as a bidder were affected by Eskom's decision: if Westinghouse submitted a bid as an agent, it could not have submitted the same bid in its own right. 55
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The general rule is that an agent does not have a legal interest in the acts it performs for its principal. For instance, if the agent concludes a contract for its principal, it Hence the majority applied the principle of separate juristic personality. The principle is, of course, a cornerstone of our company law. 62 But the principle has less significance in the context of legal standing than the majority appears to have believed. In my view, in emphasising that "[t]he issue here is about legal entities", the majority oversimplified the legal position. As I see it, the issue at root was not that Westinghouse and Westinghouse USA were different companies. The issue at root was that Westinghouse failed to explain how its interests aligned with Westinghouse USA in respect of the tender. The fact that Westinghouse was not the same company as Westinghouse USA did not, in principle, preclude such an explanation. It would all depend on the relationship between the companies, and whether this relationship gave Westinghouse a sufficient interest in Eskom's decision to award the tender to Areva. In insisting that "[t]he issue here is about legal entities", the majority seems, curiously, to have evoked the common-law requirement of a personal nexus between the litigant and the act it seeks to challenge.
The majority thus found that Westinghouse lacked legal standing to impugn Eskom's decision to award the tender to Areva. This may have been the correct outcome. The majority appears, however, to have oversimplified the law on legal standing in reaching the outcome. This could lead to confusion in future cases dealing with a litigant's own-interest standing to challenge the award of a public tender.
The Giant Concerts exception
The majority proceeded to find that the Giant Concerts exception did not apply to the facts in Areva. 63 It found, in other words, that because Westinghouse lacked standing it would not be justifiable to assess the merits of its claim. The majority's reasoning for this finding occurs in one paragraph, which I quote in full for ease of reference: I read this paragraph as containing three distinct reasons for the conclusion that the Giant Concerts exception did not apply to the facts in Areva. I will discuss each reason in turn. In my respectful view, none of the reasons are persuasive.
Areva and Westinghouse were evenly-matched bidders
The majority held that the Giant Concerts exception was not applicable because Areva and Westinghouse were "neck and neck in the competition for the tender", 64 and both companies were technically competent to replace the steam generators. In making these statements, the majority could have been saying at least two different things.
The majority could have meant that the case did not "cry out" for relief because Areva and Westinghouse were evenly-matched bidders. In terms of this line of reasoning, the case would presumably have "cried out" for relief if Areva had been an inferior bidder or if it had been incapable of replacing the steam generators.
If this is indeed what the majority meant, it overlooked an important principle of law: in determining a litigant's standing, a court must assume that the litigant's complaints about the impugned act are correct. 65 According to Westinghouse, its bid was some R140 000 000 cheaper than Areva's bid. 66 Although R140 000 000 is far less than the value of the contract between Eskom and Areva, which is approximately R5 000 000 000, 67 it is still a significant amount of money. If Westinghouse's bid was more cost-effective by R140 000 000, the dispute in Areva did, in my view, "cry out" for relief. Second, if the majority considered whether Westinghouse was entitled to a substitution order, this is something it should have considered during the remedy stage of its enquiry. The enquiry into standing precedes the enquiry into the merits, and each enquiry turns on different considerations. 72 Equally, the enquiry into merits precedes the enquiry into the appropriate remedy, and both enquiries again attract different considerations. 73 The enquiry into a remedy is therefore twice removed from the enquiry into standing. As such, the majority should not have conflated the question whether Westinghouse had an interest in the tender with the question whether the tender should be awarded to Westinghouse.
In Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of Southern
Africa Ltd 2015 5 SA 245 (CC) paras 34-59, the Constitutional Court confirmed that a substitution order under s 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of the PAJA is an extraordinary remedy. The Constitutional Court held that the remedy should be granted only where two related factors are both present. First, the court should be in as good a position as the administrator to make the impugned decision. Second, if the administrator had to make the impugned decision again, it would have to be a foregone conclusion that the administrator would make the decision in favour of the party seeking the substitution order. A court may thereafter consider other relevant factors and must ultimately decide whether it would be just and equitable to grant the substitution order.
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An interest is "academic" where it is not related to a real or practical situation. See Giant Concerts para 51. 
Areva had already started performing the tender
Finally, the majority held that the Giant Concerts exception did not apply because Areva had already started performing the tender. 76 The majority did not explain its reasoning here. It simply stated that Areva had "been working on the project for the past two years" and the deadline for the completion of its work was imminent. 77 I assume the majority meant that Westinghouse's application was academic, because even if the majority found the decision to be invalid, it would use its discretion to preserve the contract between Eskom and Areva. 78 If that is indeed what the majority meant, it again conflated the remedyenquiry with the standing-enquiry. Whether Eskom's decision should be set aside is a question to be considered in the remedy-enquiry. It is twice removed from the question that animates the standing-enquiry, namely whether Westinghouse was an appropriate litigant to challenge Eskom's decision.
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Introduction
So far I have focussed on the Constitutional Court's majority judgment in Areva. I have argued that the judgment oversimplified the law regulating the legal standing of the own-interest litigant. I have further argued that the majority's reasoning was unpersuasive in deciding that the Giant Concerts exception did not apply to the case at hand.
My focus now shifts to the Giant Concerts exception itself. I will attempt to show that the meaning of the Giant Concerts exception is unsettled. I will argue, in other words, that it is unclear when a court should consider the merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing. I will finally propose a method for dealing with this unresolved legal question.
Three interpretations
In Areva, the majority of the Constitutional Court held that the Giant Concerts exception applies only where "the public interest really cries out for that". 79 For ease of reference, I will call this "the crying-out interpretation".
According to the crying-out interpretation, a court will consider a case made by a litigant with questionable standing only if the case is obviously exceptional. It is doubtful whether such a restrictive interpretation is congruent with the broad approach to standing that the Constitution demands. However, there is some indication that the Giant Concerts exception was indeed designed to be restrictive. This can be found in the penultimate paragraph of Giant Concerts, where Cameron J wrote:
When a party has no standing, it is not necessary to consider the merits, unless there is at least a strong indication of fraud or other gross irregularity in the conduct of a public body. 80 In It is also noteworthy that in Areva the Constitutional Court did not refer to the Tulip Diamonds interpretation at all. This is a strange oversight. But perhaps it means that that the Tulip Diamonds interpretation has little precedential influence.
In contrast to the Tulip Diamonds interpretation and the crying-out interpretation, the minority in Areva interpreted the Giant Concerts proposition as laying down a flexible standard. According to the minority, the import of the Giant Concerts exception is that a court will consider the merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing where it is in the interests of justice to do so. 85 For ease of reference, I will call this "the open-ended interpretation"
.
Under the open-ended interpretation, a court has a wide discretion to decide whether it should consider the merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing. In exercising this discretion, the minority considered several factors that the majority failed to take into account. I briefly mention the two factors that are, to my mind, the most significant.
Private litigation versus public litigation
Unlike the majority, the minority took into account that Areva was not simply a commercial dispute between private entities, but that it was a publicprocurement dispute. 86 A dispute of this nature attracts broader concerns of accountability: a contract flowing from a public-procurement process is
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H VAN EETVELDT PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 16 concluded "not on the state entity's behalf, but on the public's behalf". 87 The public has an interest in public procurement because it "palpably implicates socio-economic rights". 88
In this regard, the minority could perhaps have emphasised that Areva concerned a particularly sensitive public-procurement dispute. As mentioned above, it concerned a five-billion-rand service that was crucial to the sustainability of the country's power grid and had to be performed as a nuclear safety priority.
The minority could also have engaged with the distinction between private litigation and public litigation, as discussed by O'Regan J in Ferreira v Levin. 89 The dispute in Areva may have seemed like private litigation: Westinghouse, a private company incorporated in Belgium, wanted a lucrative tender that Eskom awarded to Areva, a private company incorporated in France. But in substance it was public litigation. If Eskom awarded the tender to Areva irregularly, the resultant harm may have been "quite diffuse or amorphous" 90 and may have affected not only Westinghouse but the public at large. The fact that Areva concerned public litigation underscores why a broad approach should have been used to assess Westinghouse's legal standing.
The function of the Constitutional Court
Unlike the majority, the minority also considered the role of the Constitutional Court as a factor guiding the application of the Giant Concerts exception. Commenting on the majority judgment, Moseneke DCJ wrote:
In my view, the judgment would have been stronger if, after disposing of the standing point, it went further to say: 'In any event, the appeal on the merits is without substance.' This approach speaks to an apex court that will not lightly look away at a potential injustice only because a party may have mixed up its corporate identity within the litigating multinational group of companies. 91
This is an intriguing statement, as it evokes the debate about the function of the Constitutional Court. 92 I cannot participate in the debate here, except to note that one's views on the function of the Constitutional Court will likely correlate with one's views on the meaning of the Giant Concerts exception.
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See, for instance, Currie 1999 SAJHR 138-165; Roederer 1999 SAJHR 486-512; Fowkes 2013 CCR 309-330; Cachalia 2017 SAJHR 138-153. If one believes that the Constitutional Court functions primarily to adjudicate the dispute between the parties before it, one would likely give a cautious reading of the Giant Concerts exception. However, if one believes that the Constitutional Court is also responsible to provide guidance on constitutional issues -even if litigants present those issues to the Court abnormally or in a procedurally deficient way -one would likely give a generous reading of the Giant Concerts exception.
Formal and substantive reasoning
What underlies these different interpretations of the Giant Concerts exception? The most plausible explanation, in my view, is that the interpretations are produced by different approaches to adjudication itself.
This difference in approach can be articulated in terms of a distinction that has gained currency in South-African legal theory: the distinction between formal and substantive reasoning. 93 This distinction originates from Atiyah and Summers' well-known comparative study of the American and English legal systems. 94 On the basis of the distinction, Atiyah and Summers build a theory of adjudication the details of which I will not discuss here, as that would require an entire article on its own. For the purpose of this note I thus merely outline their general proposition in broad terms. Drawing from Atiyah and Summers' analysis, several authors have argued that the post-apartheid Constitutional era demands a shift from a formal to a substantive "vision" of the law, in which substantive reasoning is favoured over formal reasoning. 100 This "vision" does not require formal reasoning to be abandoned or established rules of law to be disregarded. Rather, it entails that, where courts apply formal rules, they should do so consistently with the substantive reasons underlying the rules. 101
In the foregoing discussion I have attempted to illustrate that the majority judgment in Areva is characterised by a high degree of formal reasoning, while the minority judgment embraces substantive reasoning. In my view, the minority's substantive reasoning was more consistent with the broad approach to standing that the Constitution demands. The broad approach to standing is a matter of positive law, having been confirmed on numerous occasions since Ferreira v Levin. 102 There is no set of instructions for applying the approach, but it seems to flow from the very idea of a broad approach that it should be applied by way of substantive reasoning. To show what this two-step exercise looks like in practical terms, I will now perform it on the facts of Areva. I will focus on three well-known justifications for limiting legal standing.
The floodgates-of-litigation justification
A popular justification for limiting legal standing is the floodgates-of-litigation argument. 106 The argument, simply put, is that courts will be overburdened by unmeritorious claims if legal standing is unlimited. Court has expressed a similar idea by saying that it "should devote its scarce resources to issues that are properly before it". 107
The floodgates argument finds no traction in Areva. As noted above, Areva was a public-procurement dispute. As far as these disputes are concerned, the floodgates are apparently already open. In 2010 the Supreme Court of Appeal noted that courts "are swamped with unsuccessful tenderers that seek to have the award of contracts set aside and for the contracts to be awarded to them." 108 As far as I am aware the flood of public-procurement litigation has not subsequently abated. So, if the Giant Concerts exception applied to the facts in Areva, this would not have opened the floodgates of litigation.
Furthermore, even if applying the Giant Concerts exception in Areva would somehow have opened the floodgates of litigation, it is debatable whether this would have been a bad thing. Because public-procurement disputes invariably attract broader concerns of accountability and transparency, it is perhaps desirable that such disputes are often subjected to judicial scrutiny. In the words of Pickering J, "it may sometimes be necessary to open the floodgates in order to irrigate the arid ground below them." 109
The resource-scarcity argument also does not work in the context of the dispute in Areva. This is because the Constitutional Court in fact devoted its scarce resources to the case. It considered the parties' affidavits and other court papers, 110 it heard the parties' submissions, including their submissions on the merits, 111 and it produced two judgments. If the majority applied the Giant Concerts exception, its only remaining work would have been to write the additional paragraphs dealing with the merits of Westinghouse's case. It is unlikely that this would have been an onerous additional burden on the Constitutional Court's resources.
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Ferreira v Levin para 41 n 69. From the judgment in Areva there is nothing to indicate that Westinghouse was not the best-placed litigant, or at least as well placed as Westinghouse USA. It seems that Westinghouse presented a comprehensive, rigorouslyargued case. Hence the best-litigant rationale is also not applicable to the facts in Areva.
The justiciability justification
A final justification for limiting legal standing is that it enables the judiciary to maintain its independence from the other branches of the state. 114 The justification, in other words, is that courts can use legal standing to dispose of cases that are not justiciable. 115 This justification clearly has no application to the facts in Areva, because it is trite that public-procurement disputes are justiciable. 116 In summary, none of the main justifications for limiting legal standing apply to the facts in Areva. In my view, this is a good reason for concluding that, even if Westinghouse had questionable legal standing, it would have been justifiable to consider the merits of its application.
Final remarks about the two-step procedure
Two remarks about the two-step procedure are called for in closing.
The first remark is that the procedure is not intended to be a "jurisprudential slot-machine" 117 that automatically generates the outcome of a case. The procedure does not intend to overlook the complexities in adjudication. Nor does it call for less analytic rigour in judicial decision-making. Instead it 112
